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Internet of Things (IoT) is an interconnected network of het-
erogeneous things through the Internet. The current and next
generation of e-health systems are dependent on IoT devices
such as wireless medical sensors. One of the most important
applications of IoT devices in the medical field is the usage of
these smart devices for emergency healthcare. In the current
interconnected world, Bluetooth Technology plays a vital
role in communication due to its less resource consumption
which suits the IoT architecture and design. However Blue-
tooth technology does not come without security flaws. In
this article, we explore various security threats in Bluetooth
communication for e-Health systems and present some ex-
amples of the attacks that have been performed on e-Health
systems by exploiting the identified vulnerabilities
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1 INTRODUCTION
Internet of Things (IoT) is a self-configuring, adaptive, com-
plex network that interconnects things to the Internet [19].
Researchers predict that the number of connected IoT de-
vices will reach 75 billion by 2025 with major portion in
healthcare sector [1]. IoT devices in medical field have vari-
ous applications such as health monitoring, curing chronic
diseases, fitness programs, etc. IoT healthcare devices de-
liver efficient management of limited resources by ensuring
appropriate service and usage for various patients, making
them a good choice for the e-Health domain. Health records
are generated and delivered on demand services to the au-
thorized personnel by the use of gateways, medical servers
and health databases. With the help of IoT devices, data is
exchanged between the devices and other networks with a
low power consumption and low computational resources.
The data exchange is possible by various communication
technologies, such as WiFi, Bluetooth, Zigbee, Z-wave, RFID,
Near Field Communication (NFC) and ultra-wide bandwidth
(UWB). Bluetooth technology is generally preferred in the
e-Health market, since it is economical, suitable for use in
compact devices and permits ad-hoc connectivity which suits
the resource constraints of IoT devices [25]. Bluetooth is a
open standard technology, using the unlicensed 2.4GHz sig-
nal range for industrial, scientific and medical (ISM) band, for
interchanging the information through radio transmission,
identifying and connecting the devices. Bluetooth Special
Interest Group (SIG) is an elemental instigator of the speci-
fication and its services [8]. The introduction of Bluetooth
technology in wireless medical sector was in the year 2003.
The Bluetooth enabled medical devices has given a innova-
tive direction to the e-Health domain [21]. Some examples
of such devices are shown in Figure 1. In the Figure, (a) is a
remote sensing Pulse Oximeter which is used for monitoring
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oxygen saturation level in patient’s body. It consists of wire-
less sensors which is placed on the patient’s body, usually on
fingertip or earlobe. This sensor device sends wavelengths
in to the patient’s body to sense oxygen absorbance. (b) is a
wireless Blood Pressure monitoring device which keeps track
of blood pressure readings. (c) shows an Electrocardiogram
which is used for heart-rate monitoring. This device consists
of a sensor, which when placed on patient’s body records
heartbeat and gives a graph of those readings .
Figure 1: Bluetooth enabled medical devices
At the same time, Bluetooth has become an attack surface
to launch various attacks. These attacks can cause serious
implications on the health of patients and sometimes, can
also threaten life. Most of the research work has been done
in identifying vulnerabilities in e-health communication us-
ing WiFi and other wireless communication technologies.
However, very less research has been done in identifying
Bluetooth communication vulnerabilities. The objective of
our research is to fill this gap by identifying weakest links
in Bluetooth communication. This paper explores Bluetooth
communication threats that can be exploited by an adver-
sary. We have performed some Bluetooth attacks on medical
IoT devices by exploiting the identified vulnerabilities. To
protect the interest of the stakeholders, we will not disclose
the make and model of these devices. The organization of the
paper is as described below: Section 2 provides an overview
and background on the IoT based e-health system architec-
ture and the Bluetooth protocol stack, Section 3 discusses
the vulnerabilities of the Bluetooth technology, cyber threats
and the Bluetooth attacks performed in our testbed. Finally,
the paper is concluded in Section 4 with further research
directions.
2 BACKGROUND
The Bluetooth technology is adopted in many application do-
mains such as laptops, cell phones, speakers, medical devices
etc. Bluetooth enables medical devices to connect more eas-
ily with each other and with the information access points
provided by LANs. Bluetooth is widely used in the e-health
systems for the Wireless Personal Area Network(WPAN).
Devices communicating in a WPAN are prone to less error
rates [29]. It facilitates the treatment of patients without
consulting to the clinic and also maintains all the critical
data of the patient, even when the individual is consulted
to more than one clinic [26]. With the aim to identify Blue-
tooth vulnerabilities in IoT medical devices, we provide in-
formation on the e-health system architecture. Figure 2, de-
scribes the IoT based health architecture. The architecture
comprises of three domains: IoT domain, Multi-cloud storage
and User/action domain. In this article, we have focused on
Bluetooth communication and its vulnerabilities, which is
part of the IoT domain. The IoT domain consists of wireless
wearable or implanted medical device which is used for data
acquisition of patient and convey the treatment accordingly.
In an emergency case of an ambulance, biosensors attached
to the patient’s body, provide real time vital biofeedback
such as body temperature of the patient in the form of alert
and recommendations to the staff inside the ambulance [4].
The communication between the patient and the caregiver
is carried out by wireless communication technologies such
as Bluetooth, WiFi and Near Field Communication (NFC).
This results in a heterogeneous scenario which composes
of different protocols and modulation schemes, This kind
of scenario presents a potentially vulnerable target for an
adversary to exploit the system and escalate the privileges
[30].
Figure 2: IoT based E-health network architecture
L.M. Ericsson invented Bluetooth technology in the year
1994 [27]. After further developments it was approved by
IEEE as the 802.15.1 standard in 2002 as the first version
of Bluetooth supporting 768 Kbps. Progressively, now Blue-
tooth is an important player in the market, with respect to its
specifications and data transfer rate that has exceeded upto
50 Mbps in its version 5 [31]. Bluetooth has 3 different classes
for various connectivity ranges: Class 1 connectivity range is
100 meters and the permitted power is about 100 mW, Class
2 connectivity range is 10 meters and the permitted power
is about 25 mW and Class 3 connectivity range is 1 meter
and the permitted power is about 1 mW. The strength of this
technology is that it supports both data and audio (i.e, asyn-
chronous and synchronous links) where re-transmission of
packets can be done through asynchronous link for error
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handling. The network is ad-hoc in nature and is known as a
piconet, where two or more Bluetooth devices are physically
nearest to communicate on the same channel with same fre-
quency hopping sequence. It operates on the unlicensed ISM
band at 2.4GHz using advance spectrum frequency hopping
technique, the hopping rate is about 1600 hop/sec for full
duplex signal. Bluetooth induces wavelengths that are lim-
ited to some operating frequencies in a specified range (short
range of communication).
However, problems arise if same frequencies are used by
many devices, which cause signal interruptions or collisions
[28]. In order to avoid and manage this issue, the signals
are expanded over wide range of frequencies. So far, vari-
ous protocols have been adopted in the Bluetooth standards
(i.e, TCP/IP stack running over PPP), Bluetooth network en-
capsulation protocol (BNEP), and object exchange protocol
for exchanges (vCalendar and vCard) with IrDA interfaces.
Similar to the Internet protocol stack, Bluetooth also have
a list of protocols that promote its communication. We will
provide a brief overview on the Bluetooth protocol stack in
the next subsection.
Bluetooth Protocol Stack
The Bluetooth protocol stack is classified as core specification
and profile specification as illustrated in Figure 3 [24]. Core
specification, demonstrates the protocols from physical layer
to the data link control with its management functions [6].
The profile specification deals with the different protocol and
functions, and it delineates how to use Bluetooth technology
[7].
Figure 3: Protocol Stack of Bluetooth
RFCOMM is a serial port emulator/cable replacement pro-
tocol and emulates the serial interface RS-232 standard.This
allows replacement of the serial cable and enables the oper-
ation of distinct applications and protocols. The signalling,
establishing and controlling of voice calls and data calls be-
tween Bluetooth devices is done by the bit oriented protocol
TCS-BIN (Telephony control protocol specification-binary)
[18]. The host controllers interface (HCI) links the baseband
and L2CAP, to access the hardware, control the register,
render the command interface, and to link manager and
baseband controller [15].
Now, the protocol stack of Bluetooth will be elaborated
for further understanding.
(1) Bluetooth Radio Layer: Carrier frequencies and out-
put power are defined in this layer. For transmission,
frequency hopping, time-division duplex scheme and
Gaussian Frequency Shift Keying (GFSK) form mod-
ulation is used at the hopping rate 1600 hops/sec [5].
Each slot is defined as the time difference between two
hops.
(2) Baseband layer: This layer defines not only physical
links and packet format but also perform frequency
hopping and interference mitigation [14]. Time Divi-
sion Duplex (TDD) is used for the transmission direc-
tions. Bluetooth packets at baseband layer consist of
following three sections:
• Access code: The packet partition is used for time
synchronization and piconet identification
• Packet header: It consists of packet type, packet flow
control, error control, address and checksum.
Packet header protection is done by a header check-
sum with Forward Error Correction(FEC)[13]. Since,
it holds valuable link and survive bit error.
• Payload: The structure of the payload field is depend
on the type of link that is being used and usually, its
size is upto 343 bytes.
(3) Physical Link: Physical links are of two types of: Syn-
chronous Connection-oriented Link (SCO) and Asyn-
chronous Connectionless Link(ACL).
(a) Synchronous connection-oriented link (SCO):
In this link the master device fixes two consecutive
slots at fixed interval of times. Three SCO links are
supported by master device for the same or different
slave device. Two links are supported by a slave to en-
able connection to different masters and up to three
links are allowed from the same master device. Var-
ious Forward Error Correction (FEC) schemes can
be applied for increasing the data amount depend-
ing upon the channel error rate. Re-transmission of
voice over data cannot be done in SCO link. A robust
technique, continuous variable slope delta (CVSD)
is applied for voice encoding to ensure the security
of the data [12].
(b) Asynchronous connectionless link (ACL):In this link
type, a polling scheme is adopted by the master de-
vice and slave devices are addressed in the priority
slots. Only one link is generated between a master
and slave. Data transmission is carried out by various
slots packets. Usually, in noisy environment, packet
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protection is accomplished by FEC schemes with
high link error rate and overhead too. Hence, Blue-
tooth proposed a fast repeat request (ARQ) scheme
for error free and efficient data transmission [12].
(4) Link Manager Protocol (LMP): This protocol
enhances the baseband functionality and covers Au-
thentication, Encryption and many other functions.
During piconet establishment the device begins inquir-
ing by broadcasting an inquiry access code(IAC) to 32
wake-up carriers. Standby devices sniff the IAC mes-
sages periodically on the wake-up carrier and enter
the inquiry mode. By setting up a piconet, the master
is able to communicate after identifying the device.
The special hopping sequence is calculated by master
based on address received by the devices and in return
synchronizes with the master clock, finally the devices
enters the fully-connected states [22].
The connection states are categorized as Active state
and the Low power states. In the Active state, the slave
listens, transmits and receives by participating in the
piconet. ACL and SCO links can be used for this pur-
pose. All devices in the active state must have a 3-bit
active member address (AMA). Bluetooth devices gets
into the low power state for less power or battery con-
sumption. Low power state is further classified into
three, namely: Sniff, Hold and Park states.
(5) L2CAP: The logical link control and adaption proto-
col(L2CAP) which creates logical channels between
various Bluetooth deviceswithQuality of Service (QoS)
properties. Three different types of logical channels
can be established between master and slave: Con-
nectionless, Connection-oriented and signalling.
Each channel has its own identity (channel identifier)
CID. CID 1 value used for signaling channel, CID value
2 is reserved for connectionless channel. Connection
oriented channel has a unique CID value greater than
64 which is dynamically assigned for each channel to
recognize the connections uniquely. The CID from 3
to 63 are reserved. Connectionless Protocol Data Units
(PDUs) is a protocol/service that provides segmenta-
tion and reassembling function.
(6) ServiceDiscoveryProtocol(SDP): It defines the new
services in the radio proximity of the Bluetooth. It only
discovers services not their usages. SDP server has to
be installed on the device for offering services to the
rest of the devices as a SDP client. Service records are
maintained about the services and service attributes
are identified by 32- bit service record handle, consist-
ing of attribute value and ID. The attribute value can
be defined as integer UUID, a string, a URL.
3 BLUETOOTH ATTACKS
Wewill explore some of the existing attacks on Bluetooth that
could be used to target medical IoT devices in this section.
Compromising of Bluetooth enabled devices and accessing
the sensitive data of the user without authorization could be
achieved by attackers through exploiting the vulnerabilities
in Bluetooth stack implementation. The vulnerabilities in
Bluetooth architecture itself presents the weakest link which
gives ways to compromise the security of communication
between devices [16].
The Bluetooth security posture is different in each version
of the standard and device driver software versions, some of
the vulnerabilities are constantly fixed in the newer versions
of the driver software.
In Bluetooth Version 4.0 there are numerous authentica-
tion challenge, which allows the attacker to get the detailed
information and to get the access on secret link keys. More-
over, the cipher function is also weak in this version[17].
Whereas, Bluetooth poses vulnerabilities in all versions, but
zero-day attacks are emerging everyday. In the section below,
we investigate some of the most significant attacks against
IoT devices using Bluetooth.
Possible Attacks
• Blue smacking: This attack is comes under the cate-
gory of "Denial of Service (DoS)" attack and "Ping of
Death attack" is also a "DoS attack". Which overflow
and burden the devices with redundant and random
packets approximately 600 bytes and multiple L2CAP
echo requests causing the device to crash [11].
• Blue snarfing: With this attack, the information can
be stolen from wireless device through a Bluetooth
connection. An adversary makes a link by exploiting
OBEX file transfer protocol [9] and collects all data
from the device.
• Bluejacking: In this attack, the attacker send multi-
ple illegitimate and irrelevant messages to Bluetooth-
enabled devices to manoeuvre the user into using an
access code allowing the attacker to access the target
files without the users’ knowledge [23].
• Blue bugging: Remotely accessible the Bluetooth en-
abled devices and using its features without the con-
sent of authorized user [23]. The attacker gets the
access and take over the RFCOMM protocol control
through the AT commands to fully control the device.
• Blue Printing: This attack collects general information
of the Bluetooth enabled device such as manufacturer
details, device information and firmware [9].
• Mac spoofing attack: In this attack the attacker inter-
cepts the data intended for other Bluetooth enabled
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devices by using an attacker Bluetooth device in the
medium of communication [23].
• MITM/Impersonation attack: Modifying data between
Bluetooth devices while communicating in a piconet
is categorized as Man In the Middle (MITM) or an
Impersonating attack [? ]. The attacker disconnects
the connection between original communicators and
establishes connection with both of them using his
device.
The Attacking Testbed
We have performed some real-time attacks by using Blue-
tooth as a communication medium between IoT medical
devices. When the data of the patient is extracted from the
medical sensors through medical devices, this data is trans-
mitted over Bluetooth Version 4.0 to the Electronic Patient
Control record where the complete activity logs of a patient
is diagnosed, monitored and recorded. The following steps
provides details on tools and testing ways by which we an-
alyzed the packets, explored Bluetooth communication to
identify vulnerabilities and to perform real-time attacks.
• Patient health record is maintained on Windows envi-
ronment with built-in Bluetooth adapter.
• Attacking node Linux with built-in Bluetooth adapter.
Figure 4 shows the attacking Testbed.
• Attacking Tools : Ubertooth One This is an open
source platform consisting of hardware and software
packages, it is an eavesdropping tool and is used to
monitor the Bluetooth traffic [2] [3]. This device suite
includes several tools, one of those is spectrum ana-
lyzer to analyze the traffic in the 2.4 GHz frequency
range and is also used for penetration testing [10].
Figure 4: Attack Testbed
• We used various tools such as Wireshark and hcidump
to analyze the Bluetooth packets, hcitool to scan the
discoverable devices and to handle the configuration
of Bluetooth connection and to provide special com-
mands for the Bluetooth devices. In case of the non-
discoverable device, it can be identified using RedFang
tool. In non-discoverable mode a device must set to
the exact hopping pattern to communicate with the
BD-ADDR and response to direct name and services
requested by inquiry request [32].
• Every Bluetooth entity have its own identity (i.e, BD-
ADDR which is similar to MAC address) which can
be spot out on the networks. By using command "hci-
config" in hcictool, it easy to identify the BD-ADDR
of the devices. The "hciconfig" command reveals the
information of the Bluetooth device, build-in adapter
including name and class [20]. In addition to these op-
erations, "hciconfig" perform various functions such
as to "enable/disable" the encryption or authentication
and "activate/deactivate" the Bluetooth devices.
Attacks Performed
We have performed sniffing of Bluetooth packets and BlueS-
mack attack on patient record collecting device with a Blue-
tooth V4. The attack performance and analysis is shown in
the following graph below.
(1) Packet Sniffing:
In our approach, we used Ubertooth tool for spectrum
analyzer and to monitor Bluetooth traffic between the
devices. By running the command hcitool scan to find
all the devices which are using Bluetooth. With the
help of Ubertooth we captured the packets of all chan-
nels during random frequency hops among channels.
Capturing encrypted packets in the process of pair-
ing between Master and slave devices is difficult to be
achieved due to the security and privacy settings of
frequency hopping technique.
Additionally, using Sdptool, useful information such
as open ports, various service versions, voice data and
channel details are gathered. This is the easiest way of
collecting information and services rendered for the
target.
(2) Bluesmack:
This attack can be performed in two ways, by using
Websploit framework tool and L2CAP echo request
it is a particular case of DoS attack. DoS is a general
category of attacks that aim at interrupting the service
which is performed based on IP. To perform this at-
tack, L2CAP echo ping command of high packet size is
used. In our experiment we have used 600 bytes packet
size. Usually, this is the maximum input buffer of fixed
length in these devices. Due to which, the input buffer
is overflowed leading to segmentation faults and fi-
nally the device gets down. We have shown the graph
of the attack scenario and normal packet transmission
in Figure 5.
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Figure 5: POD Attack Graph
The graph represents normal communication against
the attack scenario. Here, the data packets of attack and
normal scenarios are considered with respect to the
random time interval. Thus, we infer from the graph,
that sending a enormous number of packets at a time
can disrupt the whole system.
4 CONCLUSION
This paper has explored various attack scenarios in the cur-
rent Bluetooth architecture of medical IoT devices. Fixing
the vulnerabilities in Bluetooth communication is predom-
inantly important as implications of such attacks can be
devastating in e-heath system. This paper confirms the need
to re-investigate the Bluetooth architecture, its vulnerabili-
ties and attacking scenarios in medical IoT devices. In future,
we aim to identify further vulnerabilities, and to propose
detection and mitigation techniques to implement a secure
data and communication solution for the e-Health domain.
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